Objective Truth in Moral Philosophy vs. Philosophy of Science
There is a longstanding debate about the nature of ethical truths in moral philosophy. Some philosophers argue that moral truths are subjective, varying from person to person or culture to culture (moral relativism), while others believe in objective moral truths that exist independently of human opinion (moral objectivism).
In the philosophy of science, the goal is to uncover objective truths about the natural world. Scientific empiricism, objectivism, naturalism, and rationalism are philosophical approaches that emphasise scientific inquiry's objective and empirical nature. They assert that scientific knowledge is based on evidence and can be objective because it relies on observable, testable phenomena.
Divergence and the Law of Non-Contradiction
If someone claims there is no such thing as objective truth in moral philosophy but asserts objective truth in the philosophy of science, there seems to be a contradiction. The Law of Non-Contradiction states that contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense simultaneously.
Resolution and Clarification
One way to reconcile this apparent contradiction is to recognise that the domains of moral philosophy and the philosophy of science are distinct. Moral truths pertain to values, ethics, and human behaviour, which subjective factors may influence. On the other hand, scientific truths relate to empirical observations and the natural world, where objectivity is a fundamental principle. However, philosophers may adopt different stances on these issues, and their perspectives may not always be consistent. However, it is essential to understand that the methods and criteria for truth can vary across different branches of philosophy. Some philosophers might argue that objective truths exist in moral and scientific domains, while others emphasise the distinction. The resolution often depends on one's philosophical framework and the specific arguments they make.
Cyclical Paradoxes
The question of whether there is objective truth or not is itself a philosophical question. This can lead to philosophical paradoxes and debates. Philosophers have spent centuries discussing and analysing these questions without reaching a definitive conclusion.
The apparent contradiction between subjective moral truths and objective scientific truths arises from the different natures of the inquiries and the varying philosophical positions one can hold. Philosophers continue to grapple with these complex issues, and the resolution often depends on the specific philosophical framework one adopts. It's a topic of ongoing debate and exploration within the realms of philosophy and epistemology.
A Suggestion Forward In Determining Objectivity Nevertheless, a fascinating divergence emerges when the tapestry of general Western philosophy is interwoven with the intricate threads of scientific empiricism, scientific objectivism, general scientific naturalism, or scientific rationalism.
Within this philosophical panorama, a division becomes conspicuous. On one side, a cohort of thinkers avows the absence of an absolute verity in the domain of moral philosophy, asserting the primacy of subjectivity and cultural relativity. However, when these same cognoscenti pivot their discourse toward the realm of the philosophy of science, an unequivocal chorus resonates, affirming objective truth as an immutable facet of empirical investigation.
Yet, should one invoke the venerable tool of logic to scrutinise these two classifications, an unsettling dissonance manifests itself, for they appear to transgress the sacrosanct Law of Non-Contradiction in the mere sense that objectivity, as a concept, irrespective of varying evidentiary forms - is attainable - or at least, attainable in one domain where one sees fit and illusory in another. The conundrum arises as one cannot simultaneously hold that objective truth is an elusive phantom in the realm of ethics while deeming it an indomitable citadel in the theatre of science. This dialectical tension bespeaks an exigent demand for philosophical coherence: either objective truth is an irrefutable verity that transcends the boundaries of inquiry, or it remains an elusive chimera, and thus, the very fabric of reasoned discourse is entwined with an inherent paradox.
Indeed, should one choose to navigate the labyrinthine corridors of asserting the absence of truth altogether, a different enigma unfurls—a cyclical paradox that compels the contemplative mind to grapple with the notion that to deny the existence of truth is, in itself, a claim to truth. Thus, this philosophical terrain, where the boundaries between objectivity and subjectivity waver, continues to enthral, perplex, and propel wisdom seekers into the depths of perennial inquiry.
The distinction between objective truth in ascertainable facts, such as scientific laws and mathematical principles, and the apparent lack of an objective moral philosophy metric is a central topic of philosophical debate. Here are some key arguments and considerations that attempt to justify this distinction:
Epistemological Differences
One argument revolves around the epistemological differences between the domains. Science often deals with phenomena that are observable, measurable, and subject to empirical investigation. This empirical basis is thought to provide a strong foundation for objective truths. In contrast, moral philosophy deals with abstract concepts like values, ethics, and human behaviour, which may not have the same empirical basis.
Nature of Truth Claims
In science, truth claims are often based on empirical evidence and experimental verification. When scientific theories or laws are proposed, they are subject to rigorous testing and verification by the scientific community. This process helps establish the objectivity of scientific truths. In moral philosophy, truth claims often rely on different forms of reasoning, ethical theories, and philosophical argumentation, which may be perceived as more subjective.
Cultural and Historical Variability
Historically, moral values and ethical principles have exhibited considerable variability across cultures and periods. This variability can lead some to argue that moral truths if they exist, are not universally objective but rather contingent on cultural and historical factors. In contrast, scientific principles are often seen as transcending cultural and temporal differences.
Open-Endedness of Moral Questions
Moral questions are often open-ended and may lack definitive answers that can be empirically tested or universally agreed upon. In contrast, scientific questions are often more circumscribed and amenable to empirical investigation, making objective truth seem more attainable in the realm of science.
Philosophical Traditions
Different philosophical traditions have varying perspectives on the nature of truth and ethics. Some philosophical approaches, like moral relativism, argue against the existence of objective moral truths. Others, like moral objectivism, assert the presence of such truths. These philosophical traditions can influence one's stance on the objectivity of moral truths.
It is important to note that not all philosophers agree that objective truth cannot be ascertained in moral philosophy. Some moral realists argue that objective moral truths exist, although they may be more difficult to discern than scientific truths. Additionally, some argue for a middle ground, acknowledging that moral truths may have an objective component while also being influenced by subjective factors.
The distinction between objective truth in science and its potential absence in moral philosophy often hinges on differences in epistemology, the nature of truth claims, cultural variability, and the open-endedness of moral questions. Philosophers continue to explore these questions, and the debate remains integral to the broader philosophical discourse.
Certainties Exist - Or At Least We Rely Upon An Approximate Set of Assumptions? In the realm of verifiable veracity, where the tenets of scientific naturalism steadfastly abide, there exists a steadfast belief in the attainability of certainties. These certainties, embodied by the immutable laws governing the gravitational interplay, the numerical intricacies of mathematics, and the unwavering rigidity of physical laws, stand as exemplars of objective truths. Indeed, scientific naturalism is bed rocked upon the conviction that a discernible, quantifiable reality can be methodically uncovered and empirically substantiated.
Yet, a perplexing philosophical quandary materialises in the wake of such certitudes: if the sanctuary of objective truth can be unequivocally erected within this scientific domain, what then may serve as the rationale, or indeed, the apologetics, for its purportedly absent residency in the altogether distinct arena of moral philosophy?
Herein lies the crux of the matter: the justification for the repudiation of an objective metric in moral philosophy while extolling its presence in the scientific realm. The veracity of moral claims, grounded in values, ethics, and the intricate tapestry of human behaviour, stands conspicuously distinct from the empirical bedrock upon which scientific truths repose.
Arguments and rationales that purport to vindicate this dichotomy are multifaceted and traversing philosophical terrain. They encompass considerations of epistemological disparities, the elusive nature of moral truths, cultural and temporal relativism, and the inherent openness of moral inquiries, rendering them less amenable to empirical scrutiny. Amidst these intellectual crosscurrents, a distinctive demarcation emerges between these two domains, thereby propelling the perennial debate regarding the prospects and parameters of objective truth in a multivalent world of knowledge.
In the mosaic of political ideologies, some positions, such as communism, Nazism, and white supremacy, are readily identifiable and self-acknowledged by those who espouse them. These ideologies bear a distinct and often stark moral character, which individuals openly embrace, albeit often in opposition to prevailing societal norms.
In stark contrast, the prevailing milieu in many modern secular societies, exemplified by Melbourne, is one where a default political philosophy of liberalism seems to subtly envelop the collective consciousness. Liberal ideals, which champion principles such as individual freedoms, tolerance, and egalitarianism, often permeate the fabric of society so deeply that they become almost implicit and taken for granted.
This pervasive liberalism, while bearing considerable merit in promoting a pluralistic and inclusive society, also has an intriguing consequence. It tends to foster an assumption that every idea and perspective carries equal weight and validity, all in the name of tolerance and open-mindedness. This can lead individuals to adopt a panoramic view that, in essence, treats all viewpoints as equally valid.
However, this notion runs counter to the principles upheld in certain domains like science and the legal system, where rigorous standards of evidence and reasoning are applied to discern objective truths and justice. In these realms, not all ideas are considered equal, and hierarchies of validity exist based on empirical data and legal precedent.
The adoption of an overarching framework of relativism often accompanies this pervasive liberalism. Relativism implies that moral values and truths are contingent upon individual perspectives or cultural contexts. However, a striking paradox emerges: while some may embrace relativism philosophically, few will follow its implications to their logical extremes.
The reason for this reluctance lies in the realisation that if diverging or relativistic moral codes were to be imposed universally and rigorously, it might entail outcomes that individuals find personally objectionable or unjust. This tension underscores the complexity of navigating the intersection between liberalism, relativism, and the practical implementation of moral and ethical principles.
In essence, the interplay between political ideologies, liberalism, relativism, and the practical consequences of these worldviews forms a dynamic and often intricate tapestry of thought in contemporary secular societies, prompting ongoing reflection and discourse on the nature of values, ethics, and the pursuit of a just and inclusive society.
A confidant of mine recently reiterated a cogent observation that bears contemplation. He expounded, with notable acumen, that within the realm of political ideologies, individuals who align with overtly distinctive doctrines—such as communism, Nazism, or white supremacism—commonly exhibit a heightened self-awareness of their ideological moorings. These affiliations are transparent, their moral contours sharply defined, and proponents therein tend to openly identify with their chosen doctrines, despite the moral contentions they might engender within wider society.
In stark contrast, the present milieu within many contemporary secular societies, exemplified perhaps most vividly by locales like Melbourne, Australia, subtly enshrouds its denizens with the mantle of liberalism. The tenets of liberal philosophy, advocating cherished principles of individual liberties, inclusivity, and the recognition of diverse perspectives, have permeated the collective consciousness so deeply that they often remain tacit and unexamined.
This pervasive adoption of liberal ideals, while commendable in its pursuit of fostering a pluralistic and tolerant society, inadvertently engenders an implicit presumption—a presumption that every notion, irrespective of its origin or substance, enjoys a semblance of equal weight and validity. This presumption, concealed beneath the veneer of tolerance, instils a broad proclivity for an all-encompassing perspective that seems to confer parity upon all ideas and perspectives.
However, this ecumenical notion is in tension with domains of inquiry, such as science and the legal system, which operate according to distinct paradigms. In these spheres, not all concepts are deemed equal; instead, a hierarchical structure is established, predicated upon rigorous criteria, be it empirical evidence in the case of science or legal precedent in the domain of jurisprudence.
Concomitant with adopting such a relativistic perspective is the recognition that while one may hold to relativism in principle, there is a palpable reluctance to embrace its logical extremities fully. The rationale for this hesitance becomes evident when confronted with the stark realisation that the unfettered imposition of divergent or relativistic moral codes, adhering unswervingly to the tenets of relativism, could result in outcomes diametrically opposed to one's convictions or ideals of justice, thus rendering this philosophical stance fraught with practical complexities.
In sum, the interplay between diverse political ideologies, the subtle sway of liberalism, the inclination toward relativism, and the pragmatic implications of these philosophical undercurrents is a multifaceted tapestry of thought in contemporary secular societies, instigating an ongoing discourse concerning the nature of values, ethics, and the harmonious coexistence of divergent worldviews in the pursuit of societal harmony.
The reluctance to fully embrace relativism's implications is a salient observation. While the landscape of moral philosophy offers a plethora of thought experiments designed to delineate the boundaries between moral relativism and moral objectivism, the practical ramifications of embracing relativism often engender apprehension and trepidation among individuals.
Consider, for instance, the notable framework of preference utilitarianism elucidated by philosopher Peter Singer. In Western societies characterised by liberal and pan-relativistic leanings, individuals generally espouse a disposition that refrains from wholeheartedly venturing into the uncharted territories where the unvarnished realities of existence might be imposed upon them, devoid of consent. This stance, in essence, bespeaks a preference for a particular set of conditions—an inclination that prompts the imperative question: what are these conditions, and what societal or personal factors have precipitated their emergence?
Indeed, when scrutinised through the lens of practicality, relativism often evokes a sense of dissonance. Many intellectual proponents of relativism tend to engage with this philosophical framework from the comforts of their academic abodes, shielded from the stark exigencies of its practical implications. The apparent chasm between theory and practice becomes palpable when one contemplates the profound disparities that may arise should relativistic moral codes be imposed rigorously and comprehensively.
This tension between the espousal of relativism in theory and its reluctance in practice underscores the intricate complexity of moral and ethical thought in contemporary societies. It serves as a poignant reminder that the choices we make in philosophy and ethics invariably bear profound consequences, necessitating a rigorous examination of our foundational principles to navigate the multifaceted terrain of moral discourse.
The collective reluctance to traverse the precipice of unmitigated relativism is a conspicuous facet of contemporary philosophical discourse. Within the intricate domain of moral philosophy, myriad thought experiments have been meticulously crafted to demarcate the philosophical dispositions of individuals, distinguishing between the realms of moral relativism or cultural relativism and their counterparts, moral objectivism or moral absolutism—terms often invoked interchangeably despite their nuanced distinctions.
Within this intellectual tapestry, philosopher Peter Singer's seminal contributions, notably the preference utilitarianism paradigm, offer an illuminating vantage point. Singer's framework provides a prism through which one can discern that the populace of Western nations, characterised by their proclivity toward liberal and pan-relativistic worldviews, tend to be circumspect when contemplating the bleak veracity of existence that might be foisted upon them involuntarily—an unsettling prospect that contrasts starkly with the comforts of their accustomed circumstances.
Hence emerges a compelling narrative—a preference, a predilection, a predilection for specific conditions that cater to their emotional and material well-being. This preference begets a vital question: What are the precise contours of these favoured conditions, and by what intricate interplay of sociocultural factors have they been woven into contemporary existence?
In truth, relativism, when viewed through the discerning prism of practicality, appears fraught with inherent paradoxes and dissonance. The intellectual proponents of relativism, ensconced within the sanctuary of their scholarly sanctums, often engage in vociferous expositions of its theoretical tenets while remaining conspicuously distant from the crucible of its practical implications. This disjunction between the theoretical fervour and the pragmatic hesitance calls for a deeper examination—an exploration that delves into the multifaceted tapestry of moral philosophy and ethical discernment, revealing the intricate interplay between theory and practice, idealism and reality.
A captivating divergence of ideas unfolds when we blend general Western philosophy with scientific empiricism, objectivism, naturalism, and rationalism.
In this intellectual landscape, a clear divide comes into focus. On one side, some thinkers assert that moral philosophy lacks an absolute truth, emphasising the significance of subjectivity and cultural perspectives. However, when these same individuals shift their focus to the philosophy of science, they passionately endorse the concept of objective truth, a cornerstone of empirical inquiry.
This apparent contradiction raises questions when we apply logic. It violates the Law of Non-Contradiction, which states that contradictory propositions cannot be true simultaneously. This discrepancy emerges when one argues that moral truth is elusive while asserting its existence in the realm of science. It calls for philosophical consistency: objective truth exists universally or remains a paradox, challenging the foundations of reasoned discourse.
Furthermore, some individuals advocate for the absence of truth, a position known as relativism. However, few are willing to fully embrace the practical implications of relativism, where divergent moral codes might be enforced against their own beliefs. This hesitance reveals a disconnect between theory and practice in philosophical thought.
In the world of ascertainable facts, the conviction in scientific naturalism rests upon the idea that we can uncover certainties. These certainties include unchanging laws governing gravity, the precision of mathematics, and the unwavering nature of physical laws. Scientific naturalism is built upon the belief that we can systematically discover and empirically support a discernible, measurable reality.
However, a philosophical dilemma arises from this certainty: if we can establish objective truth in science, what justifies its apparent absence in moral philosophy? Moral claims, rooted in values, ethics, and the complexities of human behaviour, differ significantly from empirical scientific truths.
Various arguments attempt to justify this distinction, including differences in epistemology, the elusive nature of moral truths, cultural relativism, and the open-endedness of moral inquiries. These complexities give rise to an ongoing debate regarding the nature of truth in different knowledge domains.
The interplay between philosophy, science, and ethics unveils a complex tapestry of thought. The reluctance to fully embrace relativism's practical implications and the tensions between theoretical ideals and real-world consequences underscore the intricacies of navigating diverse philosophical perspectives in contemporary society.
Should an individual remain shielded from the whole array, or even a fraction, of the consequences of adopting divergent moral philosophies, particularly those that dismiss the sacredness of life and potentially advocate for ruthless coercion? Can one legitimately espouse theoretical relativism?
However, an observable trend appears to reveal that relativism is more frequently wielded to the detriment of others rather than to one's detriment. This asymmetry in its application is underpinned by the recognition that moral decision-making does not emanate from an unalterable tablet of principles but rather operates within a paradigm reminiscent of Aleister Crowley's famous dictum, "Do as thou wilt," a maxim that champions individual autonomy and self-interest to a degree that would undoubtedly earn Crowley's approval.
